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Abstract
Frankel and Wei [Frankel, J. A., & Wei, S.-J. (1994). Yen bloc or dollar bloc: Exchange rate policies of
the East Asian economies. In I. Takatoshi & A. Krueger (Eds.), Macroeconomic linkages. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press] developed and popularized a method for uncovering the implicit weights
assigned to major international currencies constituting a currency basket.We extend the methodology in two
dimensions: include regional competitive pressure and employ a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to
overcome simultaneity bias. With these modifications, we confirm the prominent role of the US dollar in the
exchange rate policy of East Asian economies beyond the short run. However, despite the high degree of
commitment to nominal exchange rate stability prior to the crisis, fluctuations in most East Asian currencies
are also significantly influenced by country specific shocks. The findings of the post-crisis period suggest
that East Asian exchange rate regimes have become more diverse, with the crisis countries (except
Malaysia) exercising even greater flexibility in their exchange rate management. Overall, there is weak
evidence that the East Asian economies have been benchmarking their currencies towards regional
competitors’ currencies over the longer term.
# 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
JEL classification : F33; F41
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1. Introduction
The choice of exchange rate regime is a perennial issue in international finance. Indeed, the
frequent occurrences of financial crises and speculative attacks on the adjustable peg system
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underscore the need for a judicious choice of a country’s exchange rate regime. Various East
Asian countries such as China, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore are known to have ever
pegged to or are currently targeting broad baskets of currencies,1 not least because of their
geographically diversified trade patterns. Under a basket peg system, the weights assigned to
various currencies are usually not publicly announced and often subject to manipulation. In this
paper, we investigate the exchange rate policy as practiced in East Asia.
In a seminal paper, Frankel and Wei (1994) developed and popularized a method of
uncovering the implicit weights assigned to major international currencies that constitute the
currency basket. Each weight picks up both the direct effect of the major currency on the East
Asian currency as well as the indirect effect of the major currency via the regional currencies.
This regression method has been applied to the East Asian countries and the weight assigned to
the US dollar is found to be way above that for the yen. As a result, the region has been
characterized as a ‘‘dollar bloc’’ rather than a ‘‘yen bloc’’. However, such de facto pegging of the
regional currencies to the US dollar is blamed by some for contributing to the 1997 financial
crisis by inviting excessive capital inflows and moral hazard problems (Frankel, 2003).
Consequently, many economists have called for greater flexibility in the exchange rate movement
of regional currencies (Fischer, 2001; Mishkin, 1999).
Although nominal exchange rates in East Asia are more flexible in the immediate
aftermath of the crisis, the variability of their fluctuations has by now diminished to the pre-
crisis level. According to McKinnon and Schnable (2004), many East Asian countries have
returned to a dollar peg system, termed ‘‘the East Asian Dollar Standard’’. We note that the
empirical evidence provided in both McKinnon and Schnable (2004) and Frankel and Wei
(1994) are obtained by using high frequency data such as daily or weekly nominal exchange
rates series. As such, their findings may not adequately describe longer-term exchange
rate policy. After all, official intervention operations in the foreign exchange markets are
typically carried out with the US dollar and this could affect the analysis involving high
frequency data.
Moreover, preceding research that uses the Frankel and Wei’s methodology tends to focus
only on the major international currencies such as the US dollar, the German mark and the
Japanese yen (see, inter alia, Baig, 2001; Kawai & Akiyama, 2000). In view of the intense
competition amongst the East Asian economies, questions remain as to whether they have been
benchmarking their currencies towards regional competitors’ currencies and whether any shift in
exchange rate policy has occurred following the crisis. The renewed focus on regional integration
in trade and investment in recent years also highlight the need to explicitly consider regional
currencies when determining East Asian exchange rate policy.
This paper attempts to characterize the exchange rate policy in East Asia by extending the
Frankel and Wei methodology in the following two dimensions. First, in addition to the G3
currencies, we incorporate in the currency basket a measure that captures the competitive
pressure in the third market from regional neighbors. We explicitly include regional competitors’
currencies in the model in light of the export-orientated nature of East Asian economies and the
real specter of competitive devaluation within the region. Second, in order to overcome
simultaneity bias, we replace the regression model by a vector autoregressive (VAR) model that
allows for endogenous interactions among the exchange rate variables.
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1 See Tan (2003) for a classification of the exchange rate arrangements in East Asia.
This model is applied to monthly data of the following eight countries: China, Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. By assessing the relative
sensitivities of these regional currencies to structural shocks to the US dollar, the yen, the
regional competitors’ currencies and the home currency, we identify the exchange rate policy as
practiced in East Asia. To anticipate the main findings of this paper, we confirm that the US dollar
plays a dominant role even in longer-term exchange rate policy. Interestingly, with the exception
of Malaysia, the influence of shocks to the home currency is far from negligible and is generally
greater than that to the yen and the regional competitors’ currencies. Hence, most East Asian
economies maintained a fair degree of exchange rate independence before the crisis, despite the
high degree of commitment to exchange rate stability. By comparison to the pre-crisis period, the
exchange rate regimes in the region are more diverse post-crisis. At one extreme, countries like
China and Malaysia adopt a rigid dollar peg; at the other, the crisis countries of Indonesia, Korea,
Philippines and Thailand retain a much greater degree of exchange rate flexibility with a
concomitant reduction in the role of the US dollar. Overall, the extent of benchmarking towards
regional competitor currencies appears to be small and no increase is detected following the
crisis.
The balance of this paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses the extensions to
the Frankel-Wei regression model. Section 3 describes the econometric methodology used to
model exchange rate dynamics. Empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes with some remarks on future exchange rate management.
2. Extensions to the Frankel-Wei regression model
To uncover the composition of weights given to the currencies in a currency basket, Frankel
and Wei (1994) estimate regressions in the form of Eq. (1).
Deit ¼ g þ dUSDeUSt þ dJPDeJPt þ dGDeGt þ et (1)
where the e terms denote the value of each currency in terms of the Swiss franc which is used as
the numeraire currency, and the first difference of the exchange rate is given by Det = et  et  1.
The superscripts i, US, JP and G denote an East Asian country, the US, Japan and Germany,
respectively. Given the way the exchange rate is defined, an increase in e denotes a depreciation
of that currency against the Swiss franc. In this regression, the d coefficients are considered to
represent the weights of the respective currencies in the basket. Each d coefficient measures the
combined effect of the respective major international currency’s direct impact on the East Asian
currency and its indirect impact through the regional currencies.
Applying this regression to East Asian countries yields coefficients on the dollar (dUS) that
are close to onewhile those on the yen (dJP) and theGermanmark (dG) are small and insignificant
in most cases. Based on this finding, Frankel and Wei (1994) conclude that the East Asian
countries, in their actual exchange rate policy making, are a dollar bloc. More recent estimates
reported in McKinnon and Schnable (2004) basically show the same relationship. McKinnon
(2001) terms such mutual exchange rate stabilization in the region ‘‘The East Asian Dollar
Standard’’.
While this technique seems reasonable as a description of high-frequency or very short-term
exchange rate policy, the following modifications to Eq. (1) would enhance the understanding of
medium to long-term exchange rate policy in East Asia. First, the export-led growth policy in
East Asia dictates the need for these economies to maintain trade competitiveness (see, inter alia,
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Glick & Rose, 1999; Williamson, 2000). Hence, the regression model should explicitly
incorporate regional competitive pressure. We identify two key developments that explain rising
competition amongst East Asian countries.
One is the spread of regional production networks which means firms are increasingly aware
of the potential cost shifts facing their particular industry. The other is the integration of China
into the world economy which continues to exert downward pressure on the world market prices
of labor-intensive manufactures. This pressure results in ‘‘knife-edge’’ comparative advantage
(Bhagwati, 1997), whereby small variation in costs could lead to large shifts in competitive
advantage. Going forward, as China’s exports move up the value-added chain, trade patterns of
China and other East Asian countries are likely to evolve to become even more competitive (see
International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2004).
Along with this greater competitive pressure, intra-regional trade has become more
important to the East Asian economies. Table 1 reports the intra-regional trade flows in East
Asia over the past two decades. By the 1990s, over 40% of East Asia’s exports and imports
are with countries within the region. To the extent that currency volatility creates uncertainty
and has an adverse impact on trade, intra-regional exchange rate stability is important for
economic stability in East Asia. The ongoing trade shifts from outside the region towards
intra-regional trade implies that stability in intra-regional exchange rates can be considered to
be at least as important as the stability of the East Asian exchange rate vis-a`-vis major
international currencies. By including the regional currencies explicitly in the specification of
the model, we can determine if benchmarking has been taking place amongst the East Asian
currencies.
In this paper, we introduce a regional competitor currency (RC) term eRCt to capture the
competitive pressure from neighboring countries. We construct the eRCt term for each country as
the trade-weighted average of the currency of its top four trading partners (in terms of the Swiss
Franc) in the region. While the bilateral trade weights do not completely capture competition in
third markets, Williamson (2000) has shown through the use of export similarity indices,
direction of trade statistics and principal component analysis that these eight East Asian countries
are close competitors to each other. In this study, the country weights are computed by choosing
the four most important trading partners within the region (excluding Japan) based on the
bilateral exports and imports trade data.2 In order to allow for changes in trade patterns, we use
1992 and 2001 trade data for pre-crisis and post-crisis computations, respectively. Table 2 reports
the countries and weights used for computing the regional competitor currency in the two sub-
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Table 1
Intra-regional merchandise trade within East Asia (as share of group total)
Year
1980 1985 1990 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Imports 33.1 38.0 39.1 45.3 45.8 47.1 47.9 49.1 47.8 49.5 50.4
Exports 33.7 33.1 36.5 45.8 44.8 42.7 40.1 42.7 43.6 45.0 45.9
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, 2004 as reported in Chow, Kriz, Mariano, and Tan (2005).
2 These are obtained from Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF, CD-ROM, 2004). Taiwan data are from the Aremos
databank.
periods. We observe from Table 2 that component countries and their weights vary across the East
Asian economies. Differences in component countries or the weighting pattern are also
discernible between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods for all countries except Indonesia and
Taiwan. Not surprisingly, these differences are mainly due to China gaining importance as a
trading partner after the crisis.
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Table 2
Components of regional competitor currency
Pre-Crisis (based on 1992 trade figures) Post-Crisis (based on 2001 trade figures)
China
Taiwan 39% Korea 54%
Korea 30% Singapore 16%
Singapore 19% Taiwan 16%
Indonesia 12% Malaysia 14%
Indonesia
Singapore 36% Singapore 38%
Korea 29% Korea 27%
Taiwan 19% China 18%
China 16% Taiwan 18%
Korea
China 33% China 56%
Singapore 26% Taiwan 18%
Indonesia 22% Indonesia 14%
Taiwan 19% Singapore 12%
Malaysia
Singapore 65% Singapore 53%
Taiwan 14% China 17%
Korea 11% Taiwan 16%
Thailand 10% Thailand 14%
Philippines
Taiwan 36% Taiwan 37%
Korea 25% Singapore 28%
Singapore 23% Korea 20%
Malaysia 16% Thailand 15%
Singapore
Malaysia 55% Malaysia 57%
Thailand 19% China 17%
Taiwan 16% Thailand 14%
Korea 10% Korea 12%
Taiwan
China 36% China 30%
Singapore 29% Korea 28%
Korea 19% Singapore 21%
Malaysia 16% Malaysia 21%
Thailand
Singapore 43% Singapore 33%
Taiwan 22% China 26%
Korea 18% Malaysia 24%
Malaysia 18% Taiwan 17%
When considering regional competitive pressures, the following augmented Frankel-Wei
regression, which includes the regional competitor currency (RC) term eRCt , should not be used.
Deit ¼ g þ dUSDeUSt þ dJPDeJPt þ dGDeGt þ dRCDeRCt þ et (2)
This is because the regional competitor currency variable may not be exogenous and hence, its
coefficient may not be treated as the weight of the regional competitors in the currency basket.
For instance, if the exchange rates of East Asian countries are simultaneously affected by shocks
originating from the US or other countries, the correlations between the local exchange rate and
the regional competitor exchange rate would be high, resulting in large dRC coefficients.
However, the implications on exchange rate policy would be totally different. When an
explanatory variable is determined simultaneously with the dependent variable, the former is
generally correlated to the error term which leads to biased and inconsistent ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimates. There is, therefore, a need to disentangle the simultaneity bias in
regression Eq. (2).
3. Modeling exchange rate dynamics
In light of the endogeneity and mutual interactions of the variables, we propose using the
following VAR model to estimate the relationships among the four exchange rates series3
Det ¼ b0 þ
Xp
k¼1
bkðLÞDetk þ et (3)
where the first difference of the exchange rate is given by De jt ¼ e jt  e jt1 and
Det ¼ ðDeUSt ;DeJPt ;DeRCt ;DeitÞ0; bk(L) is a 4  4 matrix of lag polynomials, and b0 is a vector
of constants. While the use of a VAR model overcomes the simultaneity bias problem, it is
difficult to recover the d coefficients in Eq. (2) which represent the weights of the respective
currencies in the basket. Alternatively, we can assess the relative importance of their innovations
by performing variance decomposition of the VAR model that gives the share of fluctuations in
the domestic currency caused by shocks to various currencies in the basket.
We do not model the linkages among the currencies in real terms. It would seem that to
maintain trade competitiveness, stabilizing the nominal exchange rate may not be a suitable
policy goal, particularly when the country’s domestic inflation rates are significantly different
from those of its competitors. Nevertheless, real exchange rates are determined by productivity
differentials and other real factors over the longer term and not by monetary policy actions.
Hence, a VARmodel estimated for the real exchange rates will reflect correlations underlying the
real determinants of real exchange rates rather than give indications about exchange rate policy.
For simplicity, we also do not incorporate asymmetric responses of the local currency to foreign
currency appreciations and depreciations. Upon testing for such asymmetric effects with the use
of dummy variables, we found symmetric responses for majority of the countries before as well
as after the crisis.4
The VAR model is estimated using monthly data for the period of 1980:1–2005:11 for the
eight East Asian countries. Although exchange rate data from the 1970s are available for most
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period. In these cases, the asymmetry is exhibited mostly against the regional competitor currency only.
countries, we start our sample later to avoid the effects of Bretton Woods agreement as well as
to have a more symmetric time span for pre- and post-crisis periods. All data are obtained from
the IFS-CD ROM, except those for Taiwan which are extracted from the Central Bank of
China, Republic of China (Taiwan). In view of the 1997 financial crises and associated
structural breaks in the region, we divide the sample into the pre-crisis period (1980:1–1997:5)
and the post-crisis period (1998:7–2005:11). In particular, Malaysia adopted the US dollar peg
while Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan adopted inflation targeting regimes
following the crisis. Such changes in monetary policy strategies will likely alter the exchange
rate dynamics over the two sample periods which calls for separate estimation in the pre- and
post-crisis periods.
We employ a VAR model in differences instead of levels based on the unit root and
cointegration tests results.5 Without exception, the exchange rate data series are found to be
integrated of order one. Granted this, we checked for cointegration between the four variables
using Johansen’s maximum eigenvalue test separately for both the pre-crisis and post-crisis
periods. We found that no cointegrating relationship exists amongst them, except for the case of
Thailand for both sample periods. Thus, we model the first differences of the exchange rate series
as in Eq. (3).
As for the number of lags ( p) in the model, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) selects an
optimal lag length 5 for most countries in the pre-crisis period. In some cases, the AIC identifies a
shorter lag length that does not adequately capture the underlying dynamics of the system. For
valid post-estimation inferences, we increase these lag lengths to eliminate serial correlation in
the residuals. Hence, we use a common lag length 5 for all countries whenmodeling the pre-crisis
period. Similarly, a common lag length 3 is used for the post-crisis period. A shorter lag length is
chosen due to the shorter sub-sample period, but this is found to be sufficient to remove serial
correlation in the residuals from post-crisis estimation.
For meaningful application of innovation accounting techniques, namely impulse response
and variance decomposition analyses, the error terms in the VAR system should be serially
and mutually uncorrelated. Since the innovations from the reduced form VAR model in
Eq. (3) are typically correlated, we apply the Cholesky decomposition which recovers the
underlying structural shocks by recursive orthogonalization. We adopt the following causal
ordering of the variables (DrUSt , Dr
JP
t , Dr
RC
t , Dr
i
t) to reflect their level of exogeneity. The
implicit assumption here is the US dollar shocks are exogenous to the yen shocks that are
exogenous the regional competitor shocks which in turn are exogenous to the home
currency shocks. For robustness check, we repeat the analyses with another plausible causal
ordering of the variables. In particular, we examine the case in which the home currency is
ordered before the regional competitor currency, that is, we experiment with the following
alternative causal ordering (DrUSt , Dr
JP
t , Dr
i
t , Dr
RC
t ). As shown in the next section, the
findings corresponding to the alternative Cholesky decomposition turn out to be qualitatively
similar.
4. Empirical results
The empirical results from the VAR model are reported in the form of variance
decompositions and impulse responses. To assess the relative importance of shocks from the
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US dollar, the yen, the regional competitor currency and the home currency as sources of
domestic exchange rate variation, we compute the variance decomposition for the home currency
and regional competitor currency variables. Table 3 reports the variance decomposition that give
the share of fluctuations in the exchange rate for the home country (HX) as well as for the regional
competitor currency (RCX) induced by the four structural shocks. The variance decomposition
are for 12-month forecast horizon, by which time both the HX and RCX forecast error
decompositions due to the various disturbances have stabilized. Each column gives the
percentage of forecast error variance due to innovations to the variable listed in the column, so
that each row adds up to 100.
We first focus on the pre-crisis findings. As expected, the US dollar plays a dominant role for
the home currency (HX). In the pre-crisis period, US dollar shocks explain more than 60% of the
exchange rate variations in all East Asian countries other than China. In sharp contrast, yen
shocks and regional competitor currency shocks matter little to domestic currency fluctuations.
The proportion of the domestic exchange rate forecast error variance due to the yen and the
regional competitor currency are both minimal, amounting to less than 11% in all countries.
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Table 3
Variance decomposition
Pre-crisis Post-crisis
eUS eJP eEA ei eUS eJP eEA ei
China
HX 49.4 4.1 0.4 46.0 95.5 0.9 0.1 0.5
RCX 82.0 7.3 10.1 0.6 72.5 0.8 25.6 1.1
Indonesia
HX 61.7 3.0 2.5 32.8 24.2 0.2 23.6 52.0
RCX 78.5 8.4 13.0 0.1 74.7 0.9 19.9 4.5
Korea
HX 78.5 6.9 0.5 14.1 42.2 4.5 0.5 52.8
RCX 77.3 6.7 15.6 0.4 82.6 0.2 5.9 11.3
Malaysia
HX 79.1 5.7 10.1 5.0 99.3 0.4 0.3 0.1
RCX 77.7 8.5 11.9 1.9 92.0 1.2 6.3 0.5
Philippines
HX 66.5 0.7 7.0 25.8 46.4 10.1 6.8 36.8
RCX 77.4 7.5 11.5 3.5 71.4 0.7 22.5 5.4
Singapore
HX 76.3 8.3 1.3 14.1 89.0 2.1 7.9 1.0
RCX 83.2 7.1 7.1 2.6 79.0 0.3 14.9 5.8
Taiwan
HX 69.2 7.8 1.3 21.7 53.7 0.2 8.8 37.3
RCX 73.3 6.6 18.5 1.6 86.5 0.3 6.7 6.5
Thailand
HX 71.7 7.5 1.0 19.8 54.0 0.4 11.1 34.4
RCX 81.1 7.9 8.6 2.4 87.8 0.7 11.5 0.0
Note: Lag lengths are 5 and 3 for all countries for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, respectively.
We note that country-specific shocks account for a significant proportion of variations in the
domestic exchange rate.6 The role of country-specific shocks is particularly high in China
perhaps because the country has not been integrated into world trade for the substantial part of the
pre-crisis period. Idiosyncrasy with the Indonesia’s exchange rate could be due to the nature of
the country’s trade as exporter of primary commodities. Country-specific shocks in the other
countries, except Malaysia, are also far from negligible—they explain between 14% to 26% of
exchange rate movements in each case. It follows that, despite the high degree of commitment to
nominal exchange rate stability, most East Asian countries maintain a fair degree of
independence in their exchange rate management before the crisis.
The exchange rate policies in the region are more varied following the crisis. US dollar
shocks account for virtually all (greater than 95%) of the domestic exchange rate variations in
China and Malaysia. It is not surprising for US dollar disturbances to exert such a strong
influence in these three countries as they have maintain a rigid US dollar peg in almost the
entire post-crisis period. The two currencies have been pegged to the US dollar since January
1994 and September 1998 for China and Malaysia, respectively. In July 2005, which is close
to the end of our sample period, both China and Malaysia abandoned their peg to the US
dollar and announced a shift in their exchange rate regimes to a basket peg and managed float,
respectively.
The US dollar continues to play an important role for Singapore, accounting for around 90%
of their domestic currency fluctuations and substantially up from 53.2% in the pre-crisis period.
This could be partly explained by the regime switch to a US dollar peg in Malaysia following the
crisis. This concurs with the findings of Fukuda (2002) that the correlation between the Singapore
dollar and the US dollar – computed from high frequency data – has shot up ever since Malaysia
adopted a fixed exchange rate. The increase is attributed to the strong economic linkages between
the two countries. Indeed, Malaysia is Singapore’s largest trading partner, with an allocated
weight of above 55% for the computation of the Singapore’s regional competitor currency in both
the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods (see Table 2).
Interestingly, exchange rate determination for the crisis countries of Indonesia, Korea, the
Philippines and Thailand turn out to be rather different. Compared to the pre-crisis period,
country-specific shocks contribute much more significantly to the exchange rate movements of
these countries after the crisis (see Table 3), suggesting that they now retain an even greater
degree of exchange rate flexibility. Along with this change, there is a concomitant reduction in
the influence of the US dollar. Meanwhile, the explanatory power of the yen went up in the case of
the Philippines while that of the regional competitor currency increased for Indonesia and
Thailand. We note that the above four crisis countries, as well as Taiwan, announced a shift from
an exchange rate based monetary policy framework to the explicit adoption of inflation targeting
in the aftermath of the crisis. The alteration of exchange rate dynamics, particularly the increase
in exchange rate flexibility, in these countries can plausibly be attributed to their adoption of
inflation targeting regimes.
We next investigate the key factors affecting regional competitor currency (RCX) fluctuations.
It is clear from Table 3 that the exchange rates of regional competitors are themselves heavily
influenced by the US dollar, before as well as after the crisis. Admittedly, a substantial part of
these variations – up to 34% – is due to its own shocks for various cases. However, when taken
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Fig. 1. Impulse responses for pre-crisis period. Note: The responses of local currency are shown in bold lines while those
of regional competitor currency are in light lines.
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Fig. 2. Impulse responses for post-crisis period.Note: The responses of local currency are shown in bold lines while those
of regional competitor currency are in light lines.
together with the variance decomposition results for the home currency, the movements in the
domestic exchange rates can hardly be attributed to the exchange rates of regional competitors
even for these cases. Overall, we find in both sub-periods that the evidence for benchmarking
towards the regional competitor currency is weak. Nevertheless, we observed earlier on that the
regime switch of a key trading partner can have a significant impact on the domestic currency of
an East Asian economy.
We next derive impulse response functions from the VAR model which show the dynamic
effects of innovations in the foreign currencies on the domestic currency as well as on the
regional competitor currency. These impulse responses give an alternative representation of the
information revealed in the variance decompositions. Panels 1a, 1b and 1c in Fig. 1 depict the
responses of the home currency (HX) and the regional competitor currency (RCX) to a unit shock
in the US dollar, the yen and the regional competitor currency, respectively, during the pre-crisis
period. The responses of HX are shown in bold lines while those of RCX are in light lines. Panels
in Fig. 2 display the corresponding impulse responses for the post-crisis period. The impulse
responses are plotted in levels and extend to 12 months. For ease of comparison, impulse
responses for all countries are drawn on the same scale.
Two features stand out clearly in Figs. 1 and 2. First, shocks to the US dollar elicit rather
different impulse responses compared with the two other shocks to the Japanese yen and regional
competitor currency. Both HX and RCX are more responsive towards to innovations in the US
dollar in both sub-periods. This concurs with the variance decomposition results whereby US
dollar shocks dominate yen and regional competitor currency shocks in determining home
currency as well as regional competitor currency movements. In view of the widespread use of
the US dollar in trade invoicing and reserve composition in East Asia, it is not surprising that the
US dollar plays such a prominent role in regional exchange rate management.
Second, the magnitude of responses to a shock in the regional competitor currency is larger
than those corresponding to a yen shock in both pre-crisis and post-crisis periods (see Figs. 1 and
2). A plausible explanation is the regional countries are closer competitors to each other than they
are to Japan. Table 4 provides the export similarity index for the East Asian countries as reported
by de Brouwer (2002).7 We see from Table 4 that each country’s export similarity index with
Japan is smaller than those with other regional economies, except for the case of Korea. Hence,
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Table 4
Export similarity index
Chn Idn Kor Mys Phl Sgp Twn Thl Jpn
Chn – 0.50 0.40 0.37 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.58 0.35
Idn 0.29 0.40 0.46 0.29 0.33 0.49 0.20
Kor – 0.43 0.35 0.48 0.54 0.38 0.66
Mys – 0.53 0.62 0.46 0.47 0.40
Phl – 0.45 0.45 0.54 0.33
Sgp – 0.63 0.46 0.47
Twn – 0.48 0.47
Thl – 0.36
Source: International Economic Databank (IEDB), as reported in de Brouwer (2002).
7 Computations are based on 1995–1997 annual merchandise export data to three-digit SITC level which are obtained
from the International Economic Databank.
shocks to the Japanese yen elicit weaker impulses from the home currency compared with shocks
to the regional competitor currency.
For robustness, we report variance decomposition in Table 5 and impulse response functions
in Figs. 3 and 4, corresponding to an alternative Cholesky decomposition. The causal ordering
which has been adopted presumes that the regional shocks are exogenous to the local currency.
Nevertheless, the domestic and regional currencies may both be responding to some common
changes such as oil price shocks. In fact, with the lone exception of Indonesia in the post crisis
period, the correlation of contemporaneous changes in the local currency and the regional
competitor currency as well as the correlation of corresponding residuals from the VAR model
are all above 65% for each country in both sub-sample periods. Hence, it is not clear what the
causal ordering of regional competitor currency and home currency should be. A plausible
identification is to reverse their ordering while maintaining that the US dollar shocks are
exogenous to the yen shocks which in turn are exogenous the home and regional competitor
shocks. That is, we repeat the analysis using the following alternative causal ordering (DrUSt ,
DrJPt , Dr
i
t , Dr
RC
t ).
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Table 5
Variance decomposition for alternative ordering
Pre-crisis Post-crisis
eUS eJP eEA ei eUS eJP eEA ei
China
HX 49.4 4.1 0.5 45.9 98.5 0.9 0.1 0.5
RCX 82.0 7.3 10.2 0.6 72.5 0.8 25.4 1.2
Indonesia
HX 61.7 3.0 2.7 32.5 24.2 0.2 2.8 72.8
RCX 78.5 8.4 13.0 0.1 74.7 0.9 24.2 0.1
Korea
HX 78.5 6.9 0.2 14.4 42.2 4.5 1.6 51.7
RCX 77.3 6.7 15.2 0.8 82.6 0.2 2.9 14.3
Malaysia
HX 79.1 5.7 6.0 9.1 99.3 0.4 0.3 0.0
RCX 77.7 8.5 13.4 0.4 92.0 1.2 6.5 0.2
Philippines
HX 66.5 0.7 5.1 27.7 46.4 10.1 0.3 43.3
RCX 77.4 7.5 12.5 2.6 71.4 0.7 14.0 13.8
Singapore
HX 76.3 8.3 0.3 15.1 89.0 2.1 6.6 2.4
RCX 83.2 7.1 4.1 5.6 79.0 0.3 20.3 0.4
Taiwan
HX 69.2 7.8 1.3 21.7 53.7 0.2 1.5 44.6
RCX 73.3 6.6 18.5 1.6 86.5 0.3 3.3 9.9
Thailand
HX 71.7 7.5 0.6 20.2 54.0 0.4 0.0 45.5
RCX 81.1 7.9 8.2 2.8 87.8 0.7 8.7 2.8
Note: Lag lengths are 5 and 3 for all countries for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, respectively.
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Fig. 3. Impulse responses for alternative ordering (pre-crisis). Note: The responses of local currency are shown in bold
lines while those of regional competitor currency are in light lines.
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Fig. 4. Impulse responses for alternative ordering (post-crisis). Note: The responses of local currency are shown in bold
lines while those of regional competitor currency are in light lines.
As evident from Table 5, we obtained qualitatively similar results for variance decomposition
although the role the regional competitor currency in explaining home currency fluctuation is
somewhat reduced. Further, as seen from Figs. 3 and 4 we obtained similar patterns from the
impulse response functions, thereby confirming the robustness of our analysis.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we study the exchange rate policy in East Asian countries by building up on the
method developed by Frankel and Wei (1994) in two important directions. We explicitly include
regional competitive pressure and employ a VAR model of nominal exchange rates. The VAR
model allows for endogenous interactions among the exchange rates of the US, Japan, East Asian
competitors and the local currency. The key findings of this paper can be summarized as follows.
We confirm that the US dollar plays a prominent role for exchange rate determination in the
region even beyond the short-run. Concomitantly, the yen plays a minimal role. Thus, the region
can hardly be viewed as a yen bloc as proposed by Kwan (2001), Ogawa and Ito (2000) and
others. Interestingly, shocks to the domestic currency are generally of greater importance than
those to the yen and the regional competitor currency. That is, all East Asian countries maintain a
fair degree of independence in exchange rate policy making prior to the crisis.
In comparison, the exchange rate regimes in the region are more varied after the crisis. China
and Malaysia have until recently adopted a fixed dollar exchange rate. By contrast, the crisis
countries of Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand have chosen even greater flexibility
in exchange rate management. Along with this change, the role of the US dollar declines, while
that for the yen and competitor currency remains largely the same for these countries. This result
is broadly consistent with Eichengreen (2001) where the extent of shocks to the currency market
that is being absorbed by the exchange rate is shown to be higher for the crisis countries post-
crisis. Overall, there is weak evidence that the East Asian economies have been benchmarking
their currencies towards regional competitors’ currencies over the longer term.
Recently, there has been renewed focus on developing regional exchange rate cooperation in
order to stabilize intra-regional exchange rates (Kawasaki &Ogawa, 2006; Ogawa, Ito, & Sasaki,
2004). In this regard, some have proposed an EMS-type system that allows for regular
realignments and that uses an Asian currency unit – a composite of regional currencies and the
yen – for benchmarking (Wilson, 2004; Wyplosz, 2001). Indeed, the Asian Development Bank
has recently announced plans to launch such an Asian currency unit to be used as a benchmark for
monitoring the movements of regional currencies. Ogawa and Shimizu (2005) also advocates the
use of deviation indicators constructed from the Asian currency unit as additional tools for the
surveillance of exchange rate policy in East Asia.
Nevertheless, it is well known that the economic linkages between the region and other
industrialized countries of the world remain vital, notwithstanding greater regional integration.
Consequently, benchmarking towards regional currencies (including the yen) alone will not
stabilize the effective exchange rates of the regional economies. Rather, policy makers in East
Asia will be confronted by the transfer of swings in major currencies into relative trade
competitiveness. Besides, the fluidity of the economic environment in East Asia such as the
economic emergence of China would call for frequent adjustments (Hefeker & Nabor, 2005) to
the ERM-type system which generates a cost in terms of regime credibility.
It is thus not clear that such a regional exchange rate arrangement is superior to a system of
flexible exchange rate management whereby each country benchmarks to its own basket of intra-
regional as well as extra-regional currencies. Should the trade patterns of the East Asian
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economies converge and intra-regional exchange rate stability become more important than
stability vis-a`-vis major currencies, adopting a common currency basket based on the Asian
currency unit could then be the way forward for future exchange rate management.
Acknowledgements
We thank Demelinda Lagunzad for capable research assistance, Yung-hsiang Ying for data
support, and the participants of the ESAM06 conference who provided useful feedback. The
authors are grateful to the Office of Research, Singapore Management University for research
grant support. We also deeply appreciate the helpful comments and suggestions made by two
anonymous referees.
References
Baig, T. (2001). Characterizing exchange rate regimes in post-crisis East Asia (IMF Working Paper WP/01/152).
Bhagwati, J. (1997). The global age: From a skeptical south to a fearful north. The World Economy, 20, 259–283.
Chow, H. K., Kriz, P. N., Mariano, R. S., & Tan, A. H. H. (2005). Trade, investment and financial integration in East Asia
(Asean + 3 Research Group Report).
de Brouwer, G. J. (2002). Does a formal common-basket peg in East Asia make economic sense? In Go rd on de Brouwer
(Ed.), Financial markets and policies in East Asia (pp. 286–314). London: Routledge.
Eichengreen, B. (2001). Hanging together? On monetary and financial cooperation in Asia. University of California,
Berkerly. Unpublished manuscript.
Fischer, S. (2001). Exchange rate regimes: Is the bipolar view correct? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), 3–24.
Frankel, J. A. (2003). Experience of and lessons from exchange rate regimes in emerging economies (NBER Working
Paper 10032).
Frankel, J. A., & Wei, S.-J. (1994). Yen bloc or dollar bloc: Exchange rate policies of the East Asian economies. In I.
Takatoshi & A. Krueger (Eds.), Macroeconomic linkages. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Fukuda, S. (2002). Post-crisis exchange rate regimes in East Asia (Empirical Analysis of Economic Institutions
Discussion Paper Series 5).
Glick, R., & Rose, A. K. (1999). Contagion and trade: Why are currency crises regional? Journal of International Money
and Finance, 18, 603–617.
Hefeker, C., & Nabor, A. (2005). China’s role in East-Asian monetary integration. International Journal of Finance and
Economics, 10, 157–166.
International Monetary Fund. (2004). China’s growth and integration into the world economy: Prospects and challenges
(IMF Occasional Paper 232).
Kawai, M., & Akiyama, S. (2000). Implications of the currency crisis for exchange rate arrangements in emerging East
Asia. World Bank.
Kawasaki, K., & Ogawa, E. (2006). What should the weights of the three major currencies be in a common currency
basket in East Asia? Asian Economic Journal, 20(1), 75–94.
Kwan, C. H. (2001). Yen bloc: Toward economic integration in Asia. Washington D.C. Brookings Institution Press.
McKinnon, R. I. (2001). After the crisis, the East Asian dollar standard resurrected. In Z. Stigliz & Y. Shahid (Eds.),
Rethinking the East Asian miracle (pp. 197–244). New York: Oxford University Press.
McKinnon, R. I., & Schnabl, G. (2004). The return to soft dollar pegging in East Asia: Mitigating conflicted virtue.
International Finance, 7(2), 169–201.
Mishkin, F. S. (1999). Lessons from the Asian crisis. Journal of International Money and Finance, 18(4), 709–723.
Ogawa, E., & Ito, T. (2000).On the desirability of a regional basket currency arrangement (NBERWorking Paper 8002).
Ogawa, E., Ito, T., & Sasaki, Y. N. (2004). Cost, benefits, and constraints of the currency basket regime for East Asia. In
Asian Development Bank (Ed.), Monetary and financial integration in East Asia: The way ahead (Vol. 2, pp. 209–
239). Palgrave.
Ogawa, E., & Shimizu, J. (2005). A deviation measurement for coordinated exchange rate policies in East Asia (REITI
Discussion Paper Series 05-E-017).
Tan, J. (2003). The possibility of an Asian monetary union drawing from the EMU experience. Asia Europe Journal, 1,
381–401.
H.K. Chow et al. / Journal of Asian Economics 18 (2007) 448–465464
Williamson, J. (2000). Exchange rate regimes for emerging markets: Reviving the intermediate option. In Policy Analysis
in International Economics 60. Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Wilson, P. (2004). Prospects for Asian exchange rate cooperation: Why an ERM solution might be the most palatable.
Paper presented at Asia Pacific economies: Multilateral versus bilateral relationships. APEC Study Center.
Wyplosz, C. (2001). A monetary union in Asia? Some European lessons. In D. Gruen & J. Simon (Eds.), Future directions
for monetary policies in East Asia (pp. 124–155). Reserve Bank of Australia.
H.K. Chow et al. / Journal of Asian Economics 18 (2007) 448–465 465
